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In intergroup settings, humans often contribute to their in-group at a personal cost. Such parochial
cooperation benefits the in-group and creates and fuels intergroup conflict when it simultaneously hurts
out-groups. Here, we introduce a new game paradigm in which individuals can display universal
cooperation (which benefits both in- and out-group) as well as parochial cooperation that does, versus
does not hurt the out-group. Using this set-up, we test hypotheses derived from group selection theory,
social identity, and bounded generalized reciprocity theory. Across three experiments we find, first, that
individuals choose parochial over universal cooperation. Second, there was no evidence for a motive to
maximize differences between in- and out-group, which is central to both group selection and social
identity theory. However, fitting bounded generalized reciprocity theory, we find that individuals with a
prosocial value orientation display parochial cooperation, provided that this does not harm the out-group;
individualists, in contrast, display parochialism whether or not nut it hurts the out-group. Our findings
were insensitive to cognitive taxation (Experiments 2–3), and emerged even when universal cooperation
served social welfare more than parochialism (Experiment 3).
Keywords: intergroup conflict, cooperation, social value orientation, social dilemmas
Intergroup relations are often marked by peaceful coexistence,
stable alliances, and mutually beneficial exchange of people,
goods, and services. Unfortunately, however, peaceful coexistence
is continuously threatened by the human tendency to limit coop-
eration and trust to the in-group, and sometimes even harm out-
groups (Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2014; De Dreu et al., 2016; Rand
& Nowak, 2013; also see Brewer, 1999; Dovidio & Gaertner,
2010; Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014). Indeed, such parochial co-
operation creates in-group advantages relative to out-groups, with
concomitant feelings of pride and superiority among in-group
members and feelings of deprivation and threat among out-group
members. This not only undermines constructive intergroup rela-
tions (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis,
2002), but also fuels conflict-intensifying responses such as pre-
emptive and retaliatory aggression (De Dreu, Aaldering, & Saygi,
2014; Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, Denson, & Schmader, 2006).
In spite of the widespread evidence for parochial cooperation
and its destructive effects on intergroup relations, two key issues
remain poorly understood. First, it is unclear whether harming
another group is a necessary component of parochial cooperation.
According to some theoretical accounts parochial cooperation is
motivated by the desire to create maximal differentiation between
the in-group and out-group and thus should emerge especially in
competitive intergroup situations when parochialism would not
only help the in-group but would also harm the out-group (e.g.,
Choi & Bowles, 2007; Rusch, 2014; Weisel & Böhm, 2015). Other
accounts, in contrast, imply that parochial cooperation emerges in
absence of a competitive motivation vis-à-vis the out-group, and
might even be mitigated by possible negative externalities imposed
on neighboring out-groups (Corr, Hargreaves Heap, Seger, &
Tsutsui, 2015; De Dreu, Balliet, & Halevy, 2014; Thielmann &
Böhm, 2016). Second, and despite the evidence that individuals
chronically differ in their cooperative inclination, current theories
about parochial cooperation remain silent about such possible
individual differences in social value orientation. This is striking
because individuals with a prosocial value orientation, relative to
more self-oriented people, not only prefer cooperation rather than
competition (Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009; Van Lange, 1999),
but are also more likely to identify with their in-group (De Cremer
& Van Dijk, 2002) and are more motivated to avoid harm to others
(Baron, 1993, 1995; De Dreu, Dussel, & Ten Velden, 2015; Van
Beest, Van Dijk, De Dreu, & Wilke, 2005). Thus, social value
orientation should shape parochial cooperation.
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Here we address these two issues. We model intergroup rela-
tions as a nested social dilemma, and develop two variants—one
in which parochial cooperation does, and one in which it does not
harm the out-group. Predictions are derived from three distinct
theoretical accounts—group selection theory (GST; Bowles &
Gintis, 2011), social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1986),
and bounded generalized reciprocity theory (BGR; Balliet et al.,
2014; Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999). We report three exper-
iments in which we tested our predictions, and examined whether
and how social value orientation shapes parochial cooperation that
harms, or does not harm, the out-group.
Intergroup Relations as Nested Social Dilemmas
Research on intergroup cooperation has used a number of ex-
perimental games to model tensions among self-interest, parochial
cooperation, and universal cooperation. In a nested social dilemma
(NSD; Halevy, Chou, Cohen, & Livingston, 2012; Polzer, Stewart,
& Simmons, 1999; Wit & Kerr, 2002), individuals are nested in
two groups that are in turn nested in one collective (see Table 1).
Individuals have personal endowments from which they can con-
tribute to their in-group (parochial cooperation) and/or to the
collective (universal cooperation). Individuals are always best off
when they keep their endowments to themselves, yet in-group
members are better off when all in-group members contribute their
endowments to the in-group, and both in-group and out-group
members are better off when all invest their resources in the
collective, than when they do not.
In the standard NSD, parochial cooperation allows groups to
peacefully coexist. Although group members indirectly withhold
profit from the out-group by restricting cooperation to the in-
group, doing so does not directly thwart out-group members’
goals. This contrasts with situations in which parochial coopera-
tion not only benefits the in-group, but also directly and simulta-
neously harms the out-group. This more competitive situation is
modeled with the NSD-intergroup prisoner’s dilemma (NSD-IPD;
Table 1). The NSD-IPD is similar to the standard NSD in that the
(ordinal) personal benefits derived from selfish keeping exceed
both parochial and universal cooperation. It differs from the stan-
dard NSD in that parochial cooperation not only benefits the
in-group (as in the NSD) but also directly and simultaneously
harms the out-group (see Bornstein, 1992). In the NSD, parochial
cooperation maximizes absolute outcomes for the in-group and
does little to differentiate the in-group from the out-group; in the
NSD-IPD, parochial cooperation serves the in-group and creates
maximal differentiation between the in-group and the out-group.
Theoretical Accounts of Parochial and
Universal Cooperation
The notion of parochial cooperation features in various theories
that are concerned with within-group processes in the context of
intergroup relations. While these various accounts share similari-
ties, they differ in the extent to which differentiation between
in-group and out-group is assumed to be critical and desirable for
parochial cooperation to come about. As we will discuss below,
some theoretical accounts imply that parochial cooperation
evolved because of, and is motivated by, the desire to create a
relative advantage for the in-group. Other accounts imply that
parochial cooperation evolved because of, and is motivated by, the
desire to create in-group efficiency and welfare, without any
additional need to harm or derogate neighboring out-groups.
Group Selection Theory
Grounded in evolutionary theory, GST (Bowles & Gintis, 2011)
proceeds from the assumption that tendencies toward parochial
(rather than universal) cooperation have been shaped throughout
evolutionary history in the context of oftentimes brutal intergroup
competition and conflict. The basic premise is that intergroup
competition and conflict forced people within groups to give up
their self-interest and help their in-group by contributing to in-
group efficiency as well as to aggress against rivalling out-groups
(Arrow, 2007; Bowles, 2008; Bowles, 2009; Choi & Bowles,
2007; De Dreu et al., 2014; Lehmann & Feldman, 2008). Those
groups who were superior in eliciting such parochial cooperation
from its members were presumably more likely to win the conflict
and to survive and spread (Bowles & Gintis, 2011).
Support for GST comes from laboratory experiments (e.g., De
Dreu et al., 2010; De Dreu et al., 2016; Efferson, Lalive, & Fehr,
2008), ethnographic and archaeological reports (Bowles & Gintis,
2004), and agent-based simulations (Bowles & Gintis, 2011;
Gunnthorsdottir & Rapoport, 2006). Each body of evidence mod-
els parochial cooperation as benefiting the in-group while simul-
taneously harming the out-group. This fits the core tenet of GST
that the individual propensity for (parochial) cooperation co-
evolved with a propensity to aggress against (rivalling) out-groups,
and that parochial cooperation serves group and individual fitness
Table 1








Keep to self NSD 1 0 0
NSD IPD 1 0 0
Parochial cooperation NSD .5 .5 0
NSD IPD .5 .5 .25
Universal cooperation NSD .25 .25 .25
NSD IPD .25 .25 .25
Note. NSD  nested social dilemma; NSD-IPD  nested social dilemma-intergroup prisoner’s dilemma;






































































































910 AALDERING, TEN VELDEN, VAN KLEEF, AND DE DREU
when and because it creates a relative advantage over other groups
and their members. If true, we should see that individuals are more
motivated to invest in their in-group when doing so creates a
relative advantage over the out-group (as in the NSD-IPD) than
when it does not (as in the NSD).
Social Identity Theory
Whereas GST models the distal causes and origins of parochial
cooperation as they are rooted in evolution, SIT (Tajfel & Turner,
1986) models more proximate motivations. It posits that individ-
uals categorize themselves and others in terms of group member-
ships, and that they derive self-esteem and a positive social identity
from the relative standing of their in-group vis-à-vis out-groups
(Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002; Heine,
Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999). To maximize the standing
of the in-group relative to the out-group, individuals engage in two
complementary strategies. First, individuals favor their in-group
by emphasizing its positive characteristics and by downplaying its
negative features. Second, individuals derogate out-groups by em-
phasizing their negative features and downplaying their positive
characteristics (Brewer, 1999; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010; Green-
wald & Pettigrew, 2014; Hewstone et al., 2002; De Dreu, Balliet
& Halevy (2014); Messick & Mackie, 1989).
Both in-group favoritism and out-group derogation strategies
should drive parochial cooperation. Underlying SIT is the assump-
tion that people seek maximal differences between their own and
other groups’ outcomes: Whether through in-group favoritism or
out-group derogation, the goal is to increase the relative standing
of the in-group compared with the out-group (Rabbie, Schot, &
Visser, 1989; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Brown, & Tajfel,
1979). Parochial cooperation enables intergroup discrimination
and promotes relative standing of the in-group more in competitive
(NSD-IPD) rather than noncompetitive (NSD) intergroup struc-
tures. From SIT we thus derive the prediction that parochial
cooperation should be stronger in the NSD-IPD than in the NSD.
This prediction is similar to the one derived from GST. The
difference between GST and SIT is in terms of the underlying
mechanism: From SIT we derive that parochial cooperation is
driven by in-group identification (Leonardelli & Brewer, 2001).
Bounded Generalized Reciprocity
BGR describes the psychological implications of evolutionary
models of cooperation. It builds on the assumption that individuals
rely on their groups for survival and prosperity (Balliet et al., 2014;
Brewer, 1999; Henrich & Henrich, 2007; Yamagishi & Mifune,
2016). This mutual interdependence among group members motivates
parochial cooperation as well as expectations of reciprocity from other
group members (Kiyonari & Yamagishi, 2004; Yamagishi & Mifune,
2008; Yamagishi et al., 1999; also see Milinski, Semmann, Bakker, &
Krambeck, 2001; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998).
Within BGR, parochial cooperation evolved from the expecta-
tion that other group members reciprocate trust and cooperation.
Building and maintaining a reputation of being a reliable and
trustworthy group member is a requirement for such indirect
reciprocity, and group membership serves as a heuristic for decid-
ing when cooperation is desirable (Balliet et al., 2014; Mifune,
Hashimoto, & Yamagishi, 2010). In contrast to GST and SIT,
BGR assumes parochial cooperation to be oriented toward and
motivated by a desire to maximize in-group welfare in absolute
terms, and not by a competitive motivation to create or maintain a
relative advantage over out-groups (Balliet et al., 2014; Mifune et
al., 2010). Accordingly, there would be little difference in paro-
chial cooperation between the NSD-IPD and the NSD, yet expec-
tations of cooperation by fellow in-group members should predict
the individual’s own parochial cooperation.
Social Value Orientation and Parochial Cooperation
Consistent with all three perspectives, we predicted that indi-
viduals in intergroup settings are inclined to show parochial rather
than universal cooperation (Hypothesis 1). Evidence for this pre-
diction would fit earlier studies on cooperation in nested social
dilemmas that found stronger contributions to the in-group rather
than collective pools (Polzer, 2004; Wit & Kerr, 2002).
Second, GST and SIT give reason to predict stronger parochial
cooperation when it can, versus cannot, create a relative advantage
over the out-group. Thus, these theories would predict more pa-
rochial cooperation in the NSD-IPD than in the NSD (Hypothesis
2). From SIT it further follows that parochial cooperation associ-
ates with in-group identification (Hypothesis 3a). Contrary to
Hypothesis 2, BGR does not predict differences in parochial co-
operation in the NSD and the NSD-IPD, given that they can both
serve to maximize in-groups’ absolute standing. BGR does inform
the prediction that parochial cooperation correlates with expecta-
tions about fellow group members’ inclination toward parochial-
ism (Hypothesis 3b).
Without exception, these predictions disregard the well-
established notion that individuals differ in their propensity to
cooperate; their social value orientation (henceforth SVO). Indi-
viduals with a prosocial orientation have greater trust in others,
value others’ outcomes more, and are more likely to cooperate than
individuals with a proself orientation (Van Lange, 1999). How do
these characteristics align with parochial cooperation? None of the
three theoretical perspectives on parochial cooperation directly
speak to this question, because none of these perspectives models
individual differences in parochial cooperation. However, by ex-
trapolating from the key tenets of the various perspectives, differ-
ential predictions concerning the role of SVO in shaping parochial
cooperation can be derived.
GST assumes that intragroup cooperation and intergroup ag-
gression have coevolved, and although the theory is silent about
potential individual differences, the existence of such differences
would be difficult to reconcile with the basic idea that parochial
cooperation evolved because of its strong fitness functionality.
Based on GST, one would therefore expect that the effects of the
interdependence structure of a social situation on parochial versus
universal cooperation are independent of SVO.
SIT provides more opportunities for incorporating individual
differences. Even though SIT is mute with regard to potential
effects of SVO, some prior studies revealed that prosocial individ-
uals identify more strongly with their in-group than proselves (De
Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002), and high identifiers favor their in-
group more than do low identifiers (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Wit
& Wilke, 1992). Accordingly, prosocials may be more likely than
proselves to display parochial cooperation. Such a pattern would






































































































911WHEN PAROCHIAL COOPERATION PREVAILS
more parochial cooperation than universal cooperation (Aaldering,
Greer, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2013; Abbink, Brandts, Hermann,
& Orzen, 2012; De Dreu, 2010; De Dreu et al., 2010, 2015; also
see Polzer, 2004). Importantly, however, according to SIT we
should see this tendency toward increased parochial cooperation
among prosocials especially in the NSD-IPD and less in the NSD,
where parochial cooperation can do little to differentiate the in-
group from the out-group. Based on SIT, we therefore predict that
especially prosocial individuals display more parochial coopera-
tion in the NSD-IPD compared with the NSD (Hypothesis 4a).
BGR holds that an important driver of parochial cooperation is
the expectation of reciprocity from other in-group members. This
postulate informs predictions about the role of SVO. First, proso-
cials are more likely than proselves to reciprocate cooperation
(Parks & Rumble, 2001; Van Lange, 1999) and, therefore, proso-
cials can be expected to exhibit more parochial cooperation than
proselves. Second, prosocials are more averse to harm others than
proselves (Van Beest et al., 2005). Third, prosocials display less
parochial than universal cooperation in competitive intergroup
settings (Thielmann & Böhm, 2016). Accordingly, and in contrast
to Hypothesis 4a, BGR implies that prosocials should be more
likely to display parochial cooperation in the NSD (where it does
not harm the out-group) than in the NSD-IPD (where it does harm
the out-group; Hypothesis 4b).
Experiment 1
Method
Participants, design, and power. One hundred seventeen
undergraduate students from the University of Amsterdam partic-
ipated in this experiment in exchange for 10 euro or course credit.
Sixteen participants were not classifiable as either prosocials or
proselves and were not included in the analyses. The 101 remain-
ing participants (71.3% female, mean age  21.98, SD  4.30)
were randomly assigned to the NSD or the NSD-IPD, resulting in
24 prosocials and 24 proselves playing the NSD, and 23 prosocials
and 30 proselves playing the NSD-IPD. Dependent variables were
investments in the in-group (parochial cooperation) and the col-
lective (universal cooperation), in-group identification, and expec-
tations about in-group cooperation. The experiment was approved
by the Ethics Committee of the Psychology Research Institute of
the University (2013-WOP-2743) and participants provided signed
informed consent prior to their experimental session.
Sample size was informed by previous research with similar
designs (De Dreu, 2010; Polzer, 2004; Thielmann & Böhm, 2016).
A meta-analysis of in-group bias in cooperation revealed an effect
size of d  .42 for social dilemma set-ups (Balliet et al., 2014),
suggesting a N  100 provides statistical power of 1-  0.69
with   .05 for the 2  2 between-subjects design (NSD/NSD-
IPD  SVO) and 1-  0.90 for the within-subjects contrast
(parochial vs. universal cooperation; based on GPower 3.0; Faul,
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).
Procedure and task. Upon arrival in the laboratory, partici-
pants were seated in individual cubicles behind a computer. The
experiment was computer-based and self-paced and did not in-
volve deception. It started with the decomposed-game measure to
assess SVO (De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Parks, 1994; Van
Lange & Kuhlman, 1994). Participants were asked to make deci-
sions in nine decomposed games. In each game, three options of
point distributions between themselves and another person were
provided. Participants were asked to imagine that this person was
an unknown other, someone they would never meet, and that the
points were valuable. Each option represents a particular SVO. An
example is the choice between Option 1 (500 points for self and
500 points for other; prosocial), Option 2 (560 points for self and
300 for other; individualistic), and Option 3 (500 points for self
and 100 for other; competitive). Participants were categorized as
prosocial (n  54) or as proself (n  47) if they made at least six
choices consistent with one of the three orientations. Consistent
with most research in this area, we combined individualists (n 
41) and competitors (n  6) into one category of proselves (De
Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Van Lange, 1999).
Following the decomposed game measure, participants com-
pleted the Need to Belong questionnaire, which served as unrelated
filler and data were not analyzed. Then, participants learned that
they were randomly assigned by the computer to Team Triangle or
Team Square, each consisting of four members who were not
necessarily all present at the same time but would all play the same
game and earnings would depend on the decisions of those four
members as well as the decisions of the members of the other team.
Participants received 10 monetary units (MU, which translated
to 0.5 euros per MU) which they could keep or invest in Pool X or
in Pool Y. MUs kept to oneself would be multiplied by two (see
also Table 1). In both the NSD and the NSD-IPD, 1 MU invested
in Pool Y (the collective pool, reflecting universal cooperation)
would be multiplied by four and divided by eight: All members of
both the own and the other group would receive 0.5 MU. In the
NSD, 1MU invested in Pool X (the in-group pool, reflecting
parochial cooperation) would be multiplied by four and divided by
four among all group members; thus, each in-group member would
receive 1MU. In contrast, in the NSD-IPD, each MU invested in
Pool X (the in-group pool) would be multiplied by four and
divided by four among the group members (thus returning 1MU to
each in-group member, as in the NSD), but also multiplied by 2
and divided by four among the members of the other group (thus
creating a cost of 0.5 MU to each out-group member; see also
Table 1). Thus, the essential difference between the NSD and the
NSD-IPD was the direct consequence of parochial cooperation for
the out-group (no consequence in the NSD vs. negative conse-
quence in the NSD-IPD). Both within and across games, the
personal costs of investing in Pool X and Pool Y were equal, and
there was no rational economic incentive on the individual level to
invest more in either pool.
Participants were told that all members of both groups would
make decisions regarding their contributions, and that final out-
comes would be determined by their own as well as by the other
group members’ decisions. MUs earned were converted at a 0.5
euros exchange rate and eligible for payout: One out of four
participants would receive extra pay-off based on the investment
decisions of themselves and the other group members. Before the
actual investments were made, participants answered practice
questions about consequences of hypothetical chip divisions to
make sure they understood the task correctly. Afterward, partici-
pants made three choices on investments in Pool X (in-group
pool), Pool Y (collective pool), and the amount of MU they wanted
to keep to themselves. To obtain a reliable measure of participants’
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similar procedure, see De Dreu et al., 2010, 2015). After their
investment choices, participants indicated the amount of MU they
expected their fellow group members as well as the members of
the other group to invest in each of the pools. Finally, a manipu-
lation check of game structure was administered. Upon finishing
the experiment, participants were thanked, paid, and debriefed.
The participants who earned extra money based on their decisions
were informed and paid after all data was gathered.
Dependent variables. Main dependent variables were the
MUs invested in the in-group pool and the collective pool.1 We
aggregated investments across the three decisions (Cronbach’s
alpha  .76 for the in-group and   .85 for the collective pool).
Total investments always summed up to 10; the program gave an
error message in case of miscalculations by the participants.
The manipulation check for game structure consisted of four
items. Participants indicated the consequences of their in- and
out-group members’ investments in Pool X and Pool Y. Answering
options varied between generating profit or loss for each of the
groups, either separately or combined. If they had understood the
task instructions correctly, participants in the NSD-IPD should
more often indicate “generates profit for own team, but loss for the
other team” than participants in the NSD for investing in Pool X,
and “generates profit for both as well as to avoid loss for the other
team” for investing in Pool Y.
Participants’ expectations about reciprocity were measured by
requesting them to type in the amount of MU they expected their
group members to invest in each of the pools. Additionally, they
were asked to indicate how many MU they expected the members
of the other group to invest in each of the pools.
In-group identification was measured with four items on a seven
point scale (adapted from Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995): “Me
and the other members of Team Triangle are alike,” “I feel con-
nected to Team Triangle,” “I would like to meet the other members
of Team Triangle again,” and “I would like to do another task with
the members of Team Triangle” (1  not at all, 7  very much;
Cronbach’s alpha  .87).2
Results
Investment decisions. A paired-sample t test showed that
investments in the in-group pool exceeded investments in the
collective pool, Min-group  3.21, SD  2.22 versus Mcollective 
2.03, SD  2.42, t(100)  3.06, p  .003, Cohen’s d  0.61, 95%
CI [.41, 1.95]. This supports Hypothesis 1. Figure 1 shows that
most participants invested more in the in-group than in the collec-
tive pool, 2(df  2, N  101)  46.95, p 	 .001, 
  0.68.
Specifically, 66 (65.3%) participants invested more in the in-group
than in the collective, and only 20 (19.8%) participants invested
more in the collective than in the in-group pool; 15 (14.9%)
invested equally in both pools.
Hypothesis 2 was tested by submitting parochial cooperation to
a 2 (Game Structure: NSD vs. NSD-IPD)  2 (SVO: prosocial vs.
proself) ANOVA. A main effect of game structure, F(1, 97) 
4.47, p  .04, p2  .04, 95% CI [.06, 1.75] showed that invest-
ments were higher (M  3.72, SD  1.87) in the NSD compared
with the NSD-IPD (M  2.75, SD  2.41). This is inconsistent
with Hypothesis 2 derived from GST and SIT, which predicted the
opposite pattern: More in-group investments in the NSD-IPD
compared with the NSD. Furthermore, although there was no main
effect of SVO, F(1, 97)  .02, p  .90, the interaction with game
structure was significant, F(1, 97)  6.14, p  .015, p2  .06.
Figure 2 shows that prosocials invested less in the NSD-IPD
compared with the NSD, F(1, 97)  11.26, p  .001, p2  .10
(95% CI [.80, 3.11]). This was not the case for proselves, F(1,
97)  .06, p  .80, p2  .001 (95% CI [1.39, 1.08]). This pattern
of results is inconsistent with Hypothesis 4a, which we derived
from SIT and predicted especially prosocials to invest more in the
in-group pool in the NSD-IPD compared with the NSD. The data
support Hypothesis 4b which we derived from BGR and predicted
more in-group investments in the NSD compared with the NSD-
IPD, especially for prosocials.
Correlates of parochial cooperation. Table 2 (below the
diagonal) shows the correlations between the investment decisions,
expectations of in-group members’ investments, and identification
with the in-group. Investments in each of the pools were negatively
correlated. In-group identification was not associated with paro-
chial cooperation. This does not support Hypothesis 3a, which we
derived from SIT and predicted a correlation between in-group
identification and parochial investments. Consistent with Hypoth-
esis 3b, which we derived from BGR, individuals’ expectations
about in-group members’ investments in each of the pools were
positively related to their own investment in the respective pool.
Discussion
Experiment 1 supported Hypothesis 1 that parochial cooperation
prevails over universal cooperation. In contrast to Hypothesis 2,
which we derived from GST and SIT, parochial cooperation was
stronger in the NSD than in the NSD-IPD. In fact, parochial
cooperation was stronger in the NSD compared with the NSD-IPD
1 Additional analyses of investments in the collective pool and amount
of MUs kept to self are not reported here, because they fall outside the
scope of the present research. A table with means is given in the Appendix
and data are available from the first author upon request.
2 We also included, for exploratory purposes, measures of expectations
about out-group members’ investments and individuals’ motivation to
invest in the parochial and the collective pool (greed, competitiveness
toward the other group, concern for fairness, concern for collective, and
concern to minimize differences) in all three experiments. These measures
were assessed at the end of each of the experiments. Expectations of
out-group members investments correlated with own investments and with
expectations of in-group members investments in each respective pool.
Analyses on the motive questions revealed main effects of social value
orientation but no additional insights important for the current conclusions
and are further ignored. Materials and results are available from the first
author upon request.
Figure 1. Percentage of individuals investing more in the parochial or in






































































































913WHEN PAROCHIAL COOPERATION PREVAILS
especially among prosocial individuals. This fits Hypothesis 4b
derived from BGR but does not support Hypothesis 4a, derived
from SIT, which predicted the opposite. Finally, no support was
obtained for Hypothesis 3a, derived from SIT, that in-group iden-
tification correlates with parochial cooperation. We did, however,
obtain evidence that expectations of reciprocity by fellow in-group
members predict parochialism (per Hypothesis 3b). Overall, find-
ings violate predictions derived from GST and SIT, and fit pre-
dictions derived from BGR: Individuals, but especially prosocials,
increase their in-group’s welfare without an attempt to maximize
the relative standing of the in-group over the out-group (also see
Thielmann & Böhm, 2016; Van Beest et al., 2005).
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was designed to replicate and extend these find-
ings. In addition to game structure and SVO, we explored the
effects of cognitive taxation on parochial cooperation. Recent
work suggests that in competitive intergroup settings such as the
NSD-IPD, parochial cooperation emerges especially when individ-
uals are cognitively taxed and more likely to make decisions
intuitively rather than based on careful deliberation (Rand, Greene,
& Nowak, 2012; De Dreu et al., 2015; Ten Velden, Daughters, &
De Dreu, 2016). Possibly, the finding that parochial cooperation is
stronger in the NSD compared with the NSD-IPD emerges espe-
cially when individuals are not only motivated but also able to take
into account that in-group cooperation harms out-group members.
If true, we should see that cognitive taxation reduces the difference
in parochial cooperation between the NSD and the NSD-IPD
observed in Experiment 1 (Hypothesis 5).
Method
Sample, design, and power. Participants (N  191), mostly
undergraduate students, took part in the experiment in exchange
for euros5 or course credit. Because 17 participants were not
classifiable as prosocial or proself, the final sample was 174
(64.9% female, mean age  22.33, SD  5.40). Participants were
randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (NSD vs. NSD-IPD) 
2 (Cognitive Taxation vs. No Taxation) factorial. Main dependent
variables were investments in the in-group Pool X (parochial
cooperation) and in the collective Pool Y (universal cooperation).
The experiment was approved by the Ethics Committee of the
Psychology Research Institute of the University (2014-WOP-
3392). Participants provided signed informed consent prior to their
experimental session and were debriefed afterward.
Using the effect size of the interaction between SVO and game
in Experiment 1, p2  .06, we needed N  121 to obtain statistical
power of 0.80. Sample size for the interaction between game
structure and cognitive taxation could not be determined a priori,
and we therefore “oversampled” to N  174. The sample was
distributed as follows across conditions: In the NSD, Nprosocials 
24 with and 25 without cognitive taxation, Nproselves  16 with and
22 without cognitive taxation. In the NSD-IPD, Nprosocials  21
with and 18 without cognitive taxation, Nproselves  22 with and 26
without cognitive taxation.
Procedure and measures. The procedure and tasks were sim-
ilar to those in Experiment 1. However, following the instructions
and practice questions of the game (NSD or NSD-IPD, depending
on condition), participants were introduced to a Stroop task
(McLeod, 1991), a common procedure to induce cognitive taxation
(De Dreu et al., 2015; Halali, Bereby-Meyer, & Ockenfels, 2013;
Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009; Ten Velden
et al., 2016). The task was introduced as a visual processing task
after participants had read the instructions for the decision making
task. Participants were presented with color words (“blue,”
“green,” “red,” or “black”) on the screen and were asked to report
the color in which the word appeared, using the appropriate color-
coded key on the keyboard. After a trial with 12 stimuli, the real
task consisting of 24 stimuli started. In the no taxation condition,
Table 2
Correlations Between Investments, Expectations and In-Group Identification
(Experiment 1 and 2)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Investments parochial X 1 .306 .538 .603 .289 .331 .269
2. Investments collective Y .401 1 .638 .088 .531 .328 .145
3. Investments self .489 .603 1 .409 .237 .558 .089
4. Expectation in-group X .414 .335 .041 1 .309 .680 .124
5. Expectation collective Y .263 .648 .388 .450 1 .487 .132
6. Expectation self .069 .397 .439 .362 .670 1 .012
7. Identification in-group .091 .170 .242 .093 .063 .143 1
Note. Entries below (above) the diagonal pertain to Experiment 1 (Experiment 2).
 p 	 .05.






































































































914 AALDERING, TEN VELDEN, VAN KLEEF, AND DE DREU
the words were congruent with the color in which they were
presented. In the taxation condition, the words did not match the
color, and participants had to suppress their automatic tendency to
press the key for the color that the word spelled, rather than the ink
color.
Following the Stroop task, participants received a summary of
the instructions in the decision making task as reminder, and
proceeded by making their decisions. We used two ways to check
whether the manipulation of cognitive taxation was successful.
One followed directly after the investment decisions, consisting of
two questions: “It took effort to indicate the color of the word” and
“Indicating the color of the word was tiring”, with a 7-point
answering scale (Pearson’s r  .50). The second one consisted of
four questions at the end of the experiment, referring to the Stroop
task: “I found this task difficult/ frustrating/ tiring/fun” on a
7-point scale (last item reverse coded;   .70). The same ques-
tions as in Experiment 1 were used to measure expectations and
identification with the own group (for the latter scale, Cronbach’s
alpha  .85). Parochial and universal cooperation were computed
as average investments in respectively the in-group (Pool X) and
collective pool (Pool Y) over five rounds (Cronbach’s alpha  .85
for parochial and .93 for collective investments).
Results
Manipulation check. To check the cognitive taxation manip-
ulation, a custom built 2 (Taxation: yes vs. no)  2 (Game
Structure: NSD vs. NSD IPD)  2 (SVO: prosocial vs. proself)
MANOVA including main effects and two-way interactions of
Taxation  SVO and Taxation  Game Structure was conducted
on the two scales measuring experienced taxation. Other interac-
tions were not included because we did not have predictions nor
the statistical power for further exploration. Participants found the
Stroop interference task more tiring and effortful (the first manip-
ulation check) in the taxation (M  3.37, SD  1.38) compared
with the no-taxation condition (M  1.98, SD  1.10, F(1, 168) 
52.24, p 	 .001, p2  .24, 95% CI [1.00, 1.75]. They also
indicated afterward that they found the task harder, more frustrat-
ing, and less fun (the second manipulation check) after taxation
(M  3.38, SD  1.23) compared with no-taxation (M  2.67,
SD  1.09, F(1, 168)  15.07, p 	 .001, p2  .08, 95% CI [.34,
1.04]). No other effects were significant. We therefore conclude
that the cognitive taxation manipulation was successful.
Investment decisions. Participants invested more in the in-
group pool (M  3.02, SD  2.25) than in the collective pool
(M  1.94, SD  2.46, t(173)  4.17, p 	 .001, Cohen’s d  0.63,
95% CI [.63, 1.77]). This supports Hypothesis 1. Figure 3 shows
that 65.5% of participants (N  114) invested more in the in-group
than in the collective. This is more than three times as many as the
18.4% (N  32) who invested more in the collective than in the
in-group (2[df  2, N  174]  81.24, p 	 .001, 
  .68). 16.1%
(N  28) invested equally in both pools.
In the next step, parochial cooperation was analyzed using an
ANOVA model that was custom built to include main effects for
game, social value orientation, cognitive taxation, and two-way
interactions involving game structure. Other interactions were not
included because we did not have predictions nor the statistical
power for further exploration. As in Experiment 1, we observed a
main effect of game structure, indicating higher investments in the
NSD (M  3.56, SD  2.15) compared with the NSD-IPD (M 
2.74, SD  2.29), F(1, 168)  4.67, p  .03, p2  .03 (95% CI
[.062, 1.38]). This provides additional evidence against Hypothesis
2, derived from GST and SIT that parochial cooperation should be
higher in the NSD-IPD than in the NSD.
We also observed that prosocials displayed stronger parochial
cooperation (M  3.56, SD  2.26) than proselves, (M  2.73,
SD  2.17), F(1, 168)  4.92, p  .03, p2  .03 (95% CI [.082,
1.40]). This effect was qualified by a significant interaction with
game structure, F(1, 168)  4.91, p  .03, p2  .03. Figure 4
shows that prosocials invested more in the in-group pool in the
NSD than in the NSD-IPD, F(1, 168)  9.72, p  .002, p2  .06
(95% CI [.54, 2.38]). Proselves did not differentiate their in-group
investments based on game structure, F(1, 168)  .002, p  .97,
p2 	 .001, (95% CI [.96, .92]). This replicates Experiment 1 and
supports Hypothesis 4b, derived from BGR, which predicted es-
pecially prosocials to invest more in the NSD than in the NSD-
IPD. At the same time, as in Experiment 1, data do not support
Hypothesis 4a, derived from SIT, which predicted the opposite
pattern for prosocials.
Hypothesis 5 predicted cognitive taxation to decrease the dif-
ference in parochial investments in the NSD versus the NSD-IPD
and was not supported. Neither the main effect of cognitive taxa-
tion, nor the interaction with game structure was significant, F(1,
168)  .05, p  .82, p2 	 .001, and F(1, 168)  .23, p  .63, p2 
.001, respectively (see Table 3 for means and standard deviations).
Correlates of parochial cooperation. As shown in Table 2
(above the diagonal), and unlike in Experiment 1, in-group iden-
tification predicted parochial cooperation (per Hypothesis 3a).
Table 2 also shows that expectations about in-group members’
reciprocity predicted parochial cooperation (per Hypothesis 3b),
which replicates Experiment 1. Thus, both in-group identification
and expectations of reciprocity predicted parochial cooperation.
Discussion
Experiment 2 replicated the key findings from Experiment 1.
First, we observed more parochial than universal cooperation, in
line with Hypothesis 1. Again, contrary to Hypothesis 2, more
parochial cooperation was observed in the NSD compared with the
NSD-IPD. In line with Hypothesis 4b, and inconsistent with Hy-
pothesis 4a, this was especially true among prosocials. Supporting
both Hypothesis 3a and 3b, parochial cooperation correlated with
both in-group identification and expectations of in-group mem-
Figure 3. Percentage of individuals investing more in the parochial or in






































































































915WHEN PAROCHIAL COOPERATION PREVAILS
bers’ cooperation. Again, we conclude that findings are largely
inconsistent with predictions derived from GST and SIT, and that
predictions based on BGR are supported.
Experiment 2 provided no evidence for moderation by cognitive
taxation (Hypothesis 5), even though manipulation checks indi-
cated that we successfully induced cognitive taxation and we had
sufficient statistical power to observe a small to medium effect
(i.e., for ƒ  0.20, 1    0.76, with our N  176). We should
be careful not to overinterpret null findings, and we therefore
tested Hypothesis 5 once again in Experiment 3. However, our
most important aim with Experiment 3 was to eliminate a possible
validity threat, emanating from the nested social dilemma structure
used in the previous two studies. Specifically, in the NSD (see also
Halevy et al., 2012) the highest maximum profit for both in- and
out-group combined could be reached either by investing every-
thing in the in-group, or by investing everything in the collective.
In the NSD-IPD, however, highest collective outcomes can only be
realized by investing in the collective. Accordingly, the finding
that (especially prosocial) individuals show parochial cooperation
mainly in the NSD (as compared with the NSD-IPD) could reflect
a general concern with social welfare. When social welfare is
maximized equally well through parochial cooperation, this can
even be considered the less risky choice as outcomes are depen-
dent on fewer interdependent others. Thus, parochial cooperation
can be considered a way to optimize social welfare in the NSD. If
social welfare can only be optimized through universal coopera-
tion, as in the NSD-IPD, this option should be chosen more.
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3 we examined this possibility by comparing two
new game paradigms: the Collective Incentive Game (CI-G) and
the Equal Outcomes Game (EO-G). Similar to the Intergroup
Prisoner’s Dilemma-Maximizing Differences Game (IPD-MD;
Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv, 2008), both games allow investments
in two in-group pools: one with, and one without direct harm to the
out-group. Similar to an NSD, both games also allow for universal
cooperation as well as the selfish option to keep money to oneself.
Thus, in both games, participants have four options: (a) to keep
their endowment; (b) to invest in an in-group pool that does not
directly harm the out-group (Pool Xno-harm); (c) to invest in an
in-group pool that does directly harm the out-group (Pool Xharm);
and (d) to invest in the collective pool (Pool Y). Options 2 and 3
both represent parochial cooperation, the first without direct out-
group harm (similar to the in-group pool in the NSD) and the latter
with direct out-group harm (similar to the in-group pool in the
NSD-IPD). Importantly, in CI-G, highest outcomes can be reached
if all individuals in both groups invest in the collective pool (Table
4 and Procedure and Measures section; see also Buchan, Grimalda,
Wilson, Brewer, Fatas, & Foddy, 2009; Wit & Kerr, 2002). In
EO-G, highest possible outcomes can be reached either when all
group members invest in the in-group pool or when they all invest
in the collective pool (see also Halevy et al., 2012).
Method
Sample, design, and power. Participants (N  172; 74.1%
female, mean age  22.92, SD  1.71) received either euros5 or
course credit, required for the undergraduate psychology curricu-
lum. Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2
(EO-G or CI-G)  2 (taxation or no taxation) design; SVO was
measured as a between subjects continuous factor. Main dependent
variables were investments in the in-group pools (with and without
out-group harm; Pool Xharm and Pool Xno-harm, respectively) and
the collective pool. The experiment was approved by the Ethics
Committee of the Psychology Research Institute of the University
(2015-WOP-4034) and participants provided signed informed con-
sent prior to their experimental session.
An a priori power analysis using G  Power 3.0 (Faul et al.,
2007) and the meta-analysis effect size of d  .42 (Balliet et al.,
2014) yielded a sample size of N  112 to obtain a power of 1 
  .80. We oversampled to have a robust test of the possible
influence of cognitive taxation.
Procedure and measures. The procedure and tasks in the
Experiment were similar to those in Experiment 2, with three main
exceptions. First, instead of the classic decomposed game measure,
Table 3
Means (and Standard Deviations) of In-Group Investments
Depending on Game Structure and Cognitive Taxation
(Experiment 2)
Cognitive taxation No taxation
NSD 3.57 (2.15) 3.55 (2.16)
NSD-IPD 2.86 (2.42) 2.62 (2.17)
Table 4









Keep to self CI 1 0 0
EO 1 0 0
Parochial Xno-harm CI .5 .5 0
EO .5 .5 0
Parochial Xharm CI .5 .5 .25
EO .5 .5 .25
Collective Y CI .4 .4 .4
EO .25 .25 .25






































































































916 AALDERING, TEN VELDEN, VAN KLEEF, AND DE DREU
the more recent slider measure was used to measure social value
orientation (Murphy, Ackermann, & Handgraaf, 2011). Partici-
pants were asked to make six decisions about how to divide a
(fictional) amount of money between themselves and another
person. They were asked to imagine that this other person was
unknown and someone they would never meet. The decisions
consisted of a slider with nine possibilities, with varying outcomes
between oneself and the other person. For example, in the second
item the options were (for self and other, respectively): 85–15;
87–19; 89–24; 91–28; 93–33; 94–37; 96–41; 98–46; 100–50).
Based on the answers, a general SVO score is computed in terms
of an angle of prosociality: An angle of 0° reflects perfect self-
interest, while a positive angle reflects more positive concern for
other’s outcomes (prosociality). A negative angle indicates nega-
tive concern for the other party: Motivation to maximize differ-
ences in outcomes. The slider measure is a continuous scale and
does not exclude individuals as unclassifiable.
Following this measure, participants received task instructions.
They learned that they would receive 10 euros and could divide
these between three different pools, or keep them to themselves.
Note that the games differ from those in the previous experiments
which had two rather than three investment pools next to the
option to keep the money. Moreover, the instructions here referred
directly to euros, and not to monetary units representing euros. In
EO-G, 1 euros invested in parochial pool Xno-harm would yield 0.5
euros return for all in-group members; 1 euro invested in parochial
pool Xharm would yield 0.5 euros return for all in-group members,
and subtract 0.5 euros from all out-group members. 1 euro invested
in universal pool Y would yield 0.25 euros return for all in-group
as well as for all out-group members. The CI-G was identical with
one exception: 1 euro invested in pool Y would now yield a return
of 0.40 euros to all members of both the in-group and the out-
group. Thus, the difference between direct outcomes as conse-
quence of investing in the in-group and the collective were now
smaller (0.5 euros vs. 0.4 euros in the CI-G compared with 0.5
euros vs. 0.25 euros in the EO-G), and maximum outcomes pos-
sibly gained were now higher on the collective level compared with
both the in-group level and the collective level in the equal outcomes
game (10  0.25 euros investments by eight group members  20
euros in EO-G, while 10  0.40 euros investments by eight group
members  32 euros in the CI-G; see Table 4). Parochial and
universal investments were computed as average over the five
rounds (see De Dreu et al., 2010 for a similar procedure). For
investments in in-group pool Xno-harm, Cronbach’s alpha  .92.
For investments in in-group pool Xharm, Cronbach’s alpha 
.81. For investments in collective Pool Y, Cronbach’s alpha  .95.
After the task instructions, we administered the same Stroop
task as in Experiment 2, with half of the participants receiving
congruent trials and the other half receiving incongruent trials.
Subsequently, participants made investment decisions and an-
swered questions regarding their expectations of in-group mem-
bers’ behavior. A final change in materials compared with the
previous experiments consisted of our measure of identification.
To measure identification in a more fine-grained manner than in
the previous experiments, we now used 11 of the 14 items of the
in-group identification scale developed by Leach et al. (2008). We
excluded the three items measuring “centrality,” because these
items would not make sense in the minimal group setting we used.
Answering was possible on a 1–7 scale (1  not at all, 7  very
much and the total 11 item scale had a Cronbach’s alpha  .94.
Results
Descriptive statistics. We excluded three participants from
further data-analyses. One invested his or her whole endowment in
the parochial pool Xharm where parochialism directly imposed
harm to the out-group, which is not only highly unusual in light of
previous research (De Dreu, 2010; Halevy et al., 2012) but also
resulted in an outlier score Z  5.95;3 two others invested more
than the maximum possible of 10 euros. Thus, the final N  169.
Investment decisions. A paired samples t test comparing in-
group and collective investments supported Hypothesis 1. In-group
investments in Pool Xno-harm and Pool Xharm combined were
higher than collective investments, t(168)  5.37, p 	 .001,
Cohen’s d  0.82, (95% CI [1.10, 2.37]; also see Table 6).
Figure 5 shows that 65.7% (N  111) invested more in the
in-group pools combined than in the collective pool, which ex-
ceeded the number of participants who invested more in the
collective pool (18.9%, N  32) than in the in-group pools by
more than three times. 15.4% (N  26) of participants invested
equally in the in-group and the collective pool, 2(df  2, N 
169)  79.89, p 	 .001, 
  0.69. In sum, the data replicated
Experiment 1 and 2, and support Hypothesis 1 that parochial
cooperation prevails over universal cooperation.
Hypothesis 2 predicted more investments in Pool Xharm than in
Pool Xno-harm. As in Experiment 1 and 2, the data did not support
this hypothesis, which was derived from GST and SIT. In fact, and
once again, we observed the opposite pattern. As shown in Table
6, more investments were made in the Pool Xno-harm than in
Pool Xharm, t(168)  9.69, p 	 .001, Cohen’s d  1.49 95% CI
[1.62, 2.45]. In fact, 71% (N  120 of participants invested more
in the Xno-harm than in the Xharm pool, which is seven times as
many as those who invested more in the Xharm than in the Xno-harm
pool (8.3%, N  14). 20.7% (N  35) invested equally in both
pools, 2(df  2, N  169)  111.85, p 	 .001, 
  0.81.).
A linear mixed model analysis with investments in Pool
Xno-harm and Pool Xharm as within-subjects factor and SVO as
between-subjects variable was conducted to test contrasting Hy-
potheses 4a and 4b. Hypothesis 4a, derived from SIT, predicted
especially prosocials to invest more in Pool Xharm than in Pool
Xno-harm. Hypothesis 4b, derived from BGR, predicted the oppo-
site: Especially prosocials should invest more in Pool Xno-harm than
in Pool Xharm. We obtained a Pool  SVO interaction: F(1,
180.816)  8.408, p  .004, Cohen’s d  0.43. Simple slopes
analysis using 1 SD from the mean SVO angle revealed that
individuals high in prosociality invested more in Pool Xno-harm
than in Pool Xharm, B  2.623, SE  0.288, t(180.816)  9.119,
p 	 .001, Cohen’s d  1.36, 95% CI [2.06, 3.19]. Those low in
prosociality also invested more in Pool Xno-harm than in Pool Xharm,
B  1.442, SE  0.288, t(180.816)  5.015, p 	 .001, Cohen’s d 
0.75, 95% CI [.87, 2.01]. However, the slope was not as steep as for
those higher in prosociality, causing the interaction. Figure 6 depicts
3 Because investing the complete endowment in the parochial pool
where parochialism includes out-group harm (Xharm) is in fact a possibility
in the current game, we also analyzed the data retaining this participant in






































































































917WHEN PAROCHIAL COOPERATION PREVAILS
the means and standard deviations using a median split for SVO for
ease of interpretation. Thus, as in Experiment 1 and 2, findings are
consistent with Hypothesis 4b and in line with BGR. Hypothesis 4a,
which we derived from SIT, received no support.
Hypothesis 5, that cognitive taxation would moderate invest-
ments in Pool Xharm and Pool Xno-harm, was tested with a mixed
ANOVA using investments in Pool Xharm and Pool Xno-harm as
within-subjects variables and cognitive taxation as between-
subjects variable. There was no main effect for cognitive taxation
on either pool Xharm, F(1, 167)  3.12, p  .08, p
2  .02, 95% CI
[.08, .36]) or on Pool Xno-harm, F(1, 167)  .001, p  .98, p
2 	
.001, 95% CI [.40, .39]). Also, the interaction between cognitive
taxation and pool was not significant, F(1, 167)  2.42, p  .12,
p2  .014 (see Table 5). As in Experiment 2, we did not observe
support for Hypothesis 5.
Correlates of parochial cooperation. Table 6 summarizes
zero-order correlations among our measures. When combining in-
group investments in Pool Xno-harm and Pool Xharm, identification
was a significant predictor, B  .38, SE  .17, t(167)  2.28, p 
.024, R2  .03, 95% CI [.05, .71]. This supports Hypothesis 3a
derived from SIT. However, identification predicted investments
in Pool Xno-harm (B  .29, SE  .15, t(167)  1.99, p  .048, R
2 
.02, 95% CI [.002, .59]) but not in Pool Xharm (B  .09, SE  .08,
t(167)  1.06, p  .29, R2  .007, 95% CI [	23.07, .25]). This
could be seen as inconsistent with the basic assumption in SIT that
in-group identification engenders a motivation to maximize differ-
ence vis-à-vis out-groups.
Expectations about in-group members’ investments predicted
actual investments in each of the in-group pools (B  .58, SE 
.069, t(167)  8.33, p 	 .001, R2  .29, 95% CI [.44, .71] for
Pool Xno-harm, strictly in-group benefiting investments, B  .51,
SE  .06, t(167)  8.57, p 	 .001, R2  .30, 95% CI [.39, .62] for
Pool Xharm, out-group harming in-group investments). This sup-
ports Hypothesis 3b derived from BGR.
Maximizing social welfare. To investigate whether invest-
ments in the in-group by prosocials are a disguised way to maxi-
mize social welfare, we conducted an ANOVA with game struc-
ture as between-subjects variable and SVO as between-subjects
continuous variable on investments in Pool Xno-harm. If prosocials
only invested in Pool Xno-harm to maximize social welfare, their
investments in Pool Xno-harm should be lower in the Collective
Incentive Game compared with the Equal Outcomes Game. There
was a main effect of SVO, with prosocials investing more in
Pool Xno-harm as described above, F(1, 165)  6.38, p  .012,
p2  .037. There was no main effect of game structure, F(1,
165)  .000, p  .99, p2 	 .001. Finally, there was no interaction
between game structure and SVO, F(1, 165)  .38, p  .54, p2 
.002. Thus, prosocials did not invest less in their in-group when
they could maximize social welfare by investing in a different (the
collective) pool.
Discussion
Using a different set of experimental games, Experiment 3
largely replicated Experiments 1 and 2. Participants exhibited a
preference for parochial over universal cooperation and preferred
parochial cooperation that does not harm the out-group. Maximiz-
ing differences in standing between the in- and out-group appeared
not to be a main motivator of parochial cooperation. These find-
ings thus contradict our derivations from SIT and GST. Supporting
our predictions derived from BGR, we found that stronger paro-
chialism in the NSD emerged especially among prosocials, who
appeared to prefer limiting their resources to the in-group, rather
than (also) using them to aggress against out-groups. Proselves
also showed parochial cooperation, but were less reluctant to
impose out-group harm.
Experiment 3 ruled out that parochial cooperation among proso-
cials is a disguised way of maximizing outcomes for both parties.
Figure 5. Percentage of individuals investing more in the combined
parochial or in the universal pool in Experiment 3.
Figure 6. Investments in the parochial Xno-harm and the parochial Xharm
pool depicted for individuals high and low in prosocial value orientation
(Experiment 3). Note: For ease of interpretation, we used a median split
and categorized individuals with an SVO angle of 32.69 or higher as high
in prosociality, and individuals with an SVO angle lower than 32.69 as low
in prosociality.
Table 5
Means (and Standard Deviations) of In-Group Investments
Depending on Game Structure and Cognitive Taxation in
Experiment 3
Cognitive taxation No taxation
Parochial Xno-harm 2.62 (2.22) 3.26 (2.51)
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Even when prosocials could reach higher outcomes on the collec-
tive level by displaying universal cooperation, they chose not to do
so. We conclude that prosocials are primarily parochial in their
cooperation as long as it does not harm the out-group.
As in Experiment 2, we did not obtain effects of cognitive
taxation on parochial cooperation. This tentatively suggests that
cognitive taxation does not influence parochial cooperation in the
social dilemma set-up studied here. Rather, expectations of coop-
eration by others predict parochialism. Although identification was
also associated with parochial cooperation when this was limited
to benefiting the in-group, it did not predict parochial cooperation
that maximizes differences between the two groups. Again, find-
ings contradict GST and SIT, and support (derivations from) BGR.
General Discussion
Parochial cooperation can potentially harm intergroup relations
and escalate conflict, when helping the own group goes at the
expense of another group. Three experiments consistently showed
that humans have a preference for parochial over universal coop-
eration. Moreover, we find that the opportunity to harm the other
group is not necessary for parochial cooperation to occur. In fact,
all three experiments show that individuals are parochial—proself
individuals are parochial regardless the consequences to the out-
group and individuals with a prosocial orientation prefer parochial
cooperation when it does not impose negative externalities on the
other group (and if it does, they shift toward universal coopera-
tion). These behavioral tendencies appeared robust against cogni-
tive taxation, and were consistently correlated with expectations
about in-group cooperation and, to a lesser extent, in-group iden-
tification.
Theoretical Implications and Limitations
Predictions based on the GST received no support. According to
GST, the propensity to help the in-group coevolved with a pro-
pensity to aggress against out-groups, and humans should prefer
parochial cooperation that directly harms the out-group (Arrow,
2007; Lehmann & Feldman, 2008). Along similar lines, but for
different reasons, SIT proposes that individuals are motivated to
maximize differences between their in-group and out-groups. To
achieve this, they should aim for increasing the relative standing of
the in-group over the out-group by both in-group favoritism and
out-group derogation (see, e.g., Hewstone et al., 2002). Following
SIT, we therefore expected even more parochial cooperation when
favoring the in-group would include rather than exclude outgroup
harm; this would increase in-groups’ relative standing the most.
None of our findings provide evidence that this maximizing dif-
ferences motive is associated with parochial cooperation. Instead,
we find strong support for the prevalence of and preference for
strictly in-group benefiting parochial cooperation that does not
(also) harm the out-group. This primary or even exclusive focus on
benefiting the in-group only is in line with BGR. According to
BGR, people are motivated to benefit the absolute welfare of the
in-group with little or no concern for out-groups, or the relative
standing of the in-group vis-à-vis the out-group (Yamagishi &
Mifune, 2008; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2016). Indeed, consistent
with BGR, all studies confirmed the predictive value of expecta-
tions about in-group members’ investments on own investments
(Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008). Our findings also support the “do no
harm” principle, stating that people are unwilling to benefit a
group if this would incur damage on others (Baron, 1995). We find
individuals reluctant to harm outgroup members, even when this
can benefit their own group. Moreover, we advance the do-no-
harm principle by showing that especially prosocial individuals are
sensitive to situational factors requiring considerations about
harming others (see also Van Beest et al., 2005).
We conclude, in sum, that our results resonate with the basic
tenets of BGR, and not with those derived from either GST or SIT.
To BGR, our findings critically add that especially prosocials are
willing to show potentially self-costly parochial cooperation—
provided it does no harm to the out-group. Put differently, predic-
tions from BGR appear most valid and predictive of behavior of
individuals with a prosocial value orientation. We note that, given
the absence of any effects for cognitive taxation in both Experi-
ment 2 and 3, we tentatively conclude also that there is no obvious
association between cognitive taxation and parochial cooperation,
and that predictions from BGR as supported here are robust against
cognitive taxation.
Our analysis thus far resides at the level of individuals making
decisions. BGR (and GST) implies that parochial cooperation is
adaptive, in that contributing to the group makes the group more
effective; this should benefit the individuals within such groups.
To directly examine this possibility, we computed collective out-
comes generated by both parties based on individuals’ investments
in Experiment 1 and 2. We aggregated individual investments of
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 to the collective of eight persons
Table 6
Descriptive Statistics and Zero-Order Correlations for All Measures (Experiment 3)
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Investments Xno-harm 2.94 3.38 1
2. Investments Xharm .91 1.29 .014
3. Investments coll Y 2.11 2.47 .242 .208
4. Investments self 4.04 3.03 .582 .247 .536
5. Expectations Xno-harm 3.10 2.24 .542
 .053 .081 .469
6. Expectations Xharm 1.40 1.42 .107 .552
 .208 .151 .065
7. Expectations collective Y 1.69 1.95 .229 .089 .542 .224 .234 .170
8. Expectations self 3.81 2.73 .337 .180 .347 .624 .620 .345 .436
9. Identification in-group 3.21 1.23 .152 .082 .209 .325 .112 .005 .037 .1
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(n  38, including individuals without a classifiable social value
orientation. Not all participants could be included in the analyses
because we analyzed collectives of eight individuals and the total
N could not be divided by eight. The collectives were computed
based on order of entrance, hence the data of the participants
entering the lab last were not used in these analyses). We then
investigated how the number of prosocials as well as game struc-
ture influenced group welfare (this includes combined investments
from all in-group members, the combined investments in their
in-group by the outgroup members, and investments in the collec-
tive by members of both groups according to the rules of the
game). A linear regression with game structure and number of
prosocials in the collective as predictors showed two main effects:
Collective outcomes were higher when participants played the
NSD rather than the NSD-IPD (B  50.43, SE  10.83, t(36) 
4.66, p 	 .001). This reflects the wastefulness of intergroup
competition. Second, group efficiency was higher when there were
more prosocials in the collective, B  9.58, SE  3.72, t(36) 
2.57, p  .014, R2  .43.4 Group efficiency thus is higher with
more prosocials and less intergroup competition. This is consistent
with BGR and not anticipated in either GST nor SIT.
Avenues for Future Research
The current experiments provide an important next step in
understanding individuals’ preference for parochial cooperation in
intergroup conflict, and the essential role of social value orienta-
tion. We developed a new paradigm that affords different cooper-
ation options faced by individuals in many real-life intergroup
interdependence structures. Our findings also beget new research
questions. For example, we found that individuals are less likely to
show parochialism when this directly harms the other party, and
another cooperation option is readily available. More research is
needed to identify when individuals are willing to inflict harm on
another party if this can benefit their in-group. Situations such as
intergroup conflicts, which do not easily allow for collectively
beneficial options, are easily conceivable. The current results sug-
gest, however, that prosocials are willing to indirectly harm the
out-group by withholding benefits from them but not by actively
incurring costs. This stands in contrast with previous studies show-
ing that prosocials are willing to benefit their in-group at the
expense of the other party (e.g., Abbink et al., 2012). More
research is needed to provide conclusive evidence regarding the
circumstances under which prosocials are willing to accept harm to
the other party as “collateral damage” in their search to benefit the
in-group.
Future research could also specifically test predictions of each
of the theoretical viewpoints. Our data do not support our deriva-
tions from group selection theory or social identity theory. Results
support better bounded generalized reciprocity theory, especially
for prosocial individuals. To further investigate the mechanisms
underlying parochial cooperation, future work could manipulate
rather than measure concepts relating to SIT and BGR. Manipu-
lation of interdependence between group membership (uni- or
bilateral awareness of common in-group membership) for example
has proven fruitful in distinguishing between mere categorization
and reciprocity as motives for in-group cooperation (Balliet et al.,
2014; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008). Similarly, varying the coop-
erative reputation of fellow in- but also out-group members should
in- or decrease prosocials’ parochial and universal cooperation if
bounded generalized reciprocity theory can explain their behavior
(Romano, Balliet, & Wu, 2017). Identification with in-group mem-
bers could also be manipulated or measured in field experiments to
investigate the role of in-group identification in explaining paro-
chial cooperation more closely.
Within intergroup interdependence structures, parochialism is
not always the only possible form of cooperation. A collectively
beneficial option in a conflict is often available, if only the con-
flicting parties are willing to explore it. Diplomacy and negotia-
tions are constructive means toward conflict resolution and can
lead to agreements accepted by both parties, with peace and
prosperity as a result (Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994). Our findings
thus bear implications for negotiation research as well. In repre-
sentative negotiations, representatives of groups also face a coop-
eration dilemma where they are pressured by their constituency to
defend their interests, but pressured by the other negotiation party
to compromise and reach an agreement (Druckman, 1977). Re-
search into group influences on cooperation in representative ne-
gotiations has shown that representatives are likely to follow the
group norm as established by their constituency, which may guide
them toward suboptimal decisions or even conflict escalation to
serve the groups’ interests (Aaldering & De Dreu, 2012; Aaldering
& Ten Velden, 2016; Steinel, De Dreu, Ouwehand, & Ramírez-
Marín, 2009; Steinel, Van Kleef, Van Knippenberg, Hogg,
Homan, & Moffit, 2010). Future research could investigate mul-
tiissue negotiations with room for a unilateral (parochial) but also
a bilateral (universal) cooperative agreement, thereby varying the
competition between the groups, characteristics of the constituency
and cognitive restraints on the representatives. Such research
would be fruitful in showing the robustness of our findings in a
practical negotiation context, as well as refining our conclusions
regarding other boundary conditions of prosocials’ parochial co-
operation.
Conclusion
The in-group advantages created by parochial cooperation can
undermine intergroup relations and even elicit or intensify inter-
group conflict. In three experiments we tested hypotheses derived
from three important theoretical perspectives on in-group cooper-
ation, and showed that individuals are inclined to show parochial
rather than universal cooperation. Crucially, we also found that
whereas proself individuals are parochial regardless its conse-
quences for the out-group, prosocials are parochial to the extent
that it does not hurt out-groups: They are unwilling to impose harm
on the out-group. To paraphrase Allport (1954): People live in and
contribute to their own group, and especially prosocial individuals
do so in ways that avoid harming out-groups.
4 When including the amount of chips individuals decided to keep to
themselves (multiplied by two according to the rules of the games), results
did not differ: Higher outcomes were predicted by collective entities
playing the NSD (B  45.80, SE  6.16, t(36)  7.44, p 	 .001) and by
a higher number of prosocials within the collective (B  5.68, SE  2.12,
t(36)  2.68, p  .011, R2  .63). Thus, even when including selfish
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Appendix
Overall Means and Standard Deviations of the Investments in Experiments 1–3
Experiment 1 Pool X Pool Y Self
NSD 3.72 (1.87)a,b 1.44 (1.97)a 4.84 (2.34)b
NSDIPD 2.75 (2.41)b 2.57 (2.68) 4.69 (2.73)b
Prosocials 3.14 (2.12) 2.99 (2.79) 3.87 (2.04)
Proselves 3.30 (2.34)a,b .92 (1.19)a 5.78 (2.70)b
Experiment 2 Pool X Pool Y Self
NSD 3.56 (2.15)a,b 1.92 (2.47)a 4.52 (2.73)b
NSD-IPD 2.74 (2.29)a,b 1.97 (2.47)a 5.30 (2.80)b
Prosocials 3.56 (2.26)a 2.51 (2.48)a 3.94 (2.46)
Proselves 2.73 (2.17)a,b 1.37 (2.32)a 5.90 (2.75)b
Cognitive taxation 3.20 (2.31)a,b 1.74 (2.02)a 5.07 (2.79)b
No taxation 3.10 (2.21)a,b 2.13 (2.81)a 4.77 (2.78)b
Experiment 3 Pool Xno-harm Pool Xharm Pool Y Self
CI-G 2.68 (1.96)b .78 (1.22)c,d 2.56 (2.40)c 3.98 (2.87)b,d
EO-G 3.19 (2.72)a 1.03 (1.35)d 1.68 (2.47)a 4.10 (3.19)d
High prosocials 3.35 (1.31)a,b .76 (.6)c,d 2.63 (2.74)a,c 3.27 (2.75)b,d
Low prosocials 2.52 (1.00)a,b 1.06 (.65)d 1.60 (2.05)a 4.82 (3.12)b,d
Cognitive taxation 2.62 (2.22)b .91 (1.16)c,d 1.98 (2.20)c 4.49 (3.02)b,d
No taxation 3.26 (2.51)a .90 (1.43)c,d 2.24 (2.72)a,c 3.60 (2.99)d
Note. CI-G  Collective Incentive Game; EO-G  Equal Outcomes Game; high and low prosocials are based on a median
split where we categorized individuals with an SVO angle of 32.69 or higher as high in prosociality, and individuals with
an SVO angle lower than 32.69 as low in prosociality.
a Investments in Pool Xno-harm and Pool Y differ significantly per row.
b Investments in Pool Xno-harm and Pool Self differs
significantly per row. c Investments in Pool Xharm and Pool Y differ significantly per row.
d Investments in Pool Xharm
and Pool Self differs significantly per row.
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